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ABOUT STATISTICAL DISTRIBUTION
ABSTRACT. In recent years, semiotics has become an innovative theoretical framework
in mathematics education. The purpose of this article is to show that semiotics can be used
to explain learning as a process of experimenting with and communicating about one’s own
representations (in particular ‘diagrams’) of mathematical problems. As a paradigmatic
example, we apply a Peircean semiotic framework to answer the question of how students
develop a notion of ‘distribution’ in a statistics course by ‘diagrammatic reasoning’ and by
forming ‘hypostatic abstractions’, that is by forming new mathematical objects which can
be used as means for communication and further reasoning. Peirce’s semiotic terminology
is used as an alternative to concepts such as modeling, symbolizing, and reification. We will
show that it is a precise instrument of analysis with regard to the complexity of learning
and communicating in mathematics classrooms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is a most fascinating moment when we can observe students learning from
representations they have constructed for themselves, and experimenting
with and communicating about those representations. Thus, it is no surprise
that discussing the role of signs and the activities of symbolizing and mod-
eling have become major topics in mathematics education research during
the recent years.1 In a more theoretical manner, this topic has been tackled
under the heading of semiotics in mathematics education.2 By reflecting on
the role of signs from a semiotic point of view, the following issues have
become clear. First, the possibility of mathematical knowledge depends
on the possibility of representing it (Ernest, in press). Second, whatever
the objects of mathematical knowledge may be, our access to those ob-
jects can be described, from an epistemological perspective, as mediated
by signs.3 Third, understanding mathematics presupposes the ability both
to transform representations within given ‘representational systems’ and
to change between different systems (Duval, in press). Fourth, representa-
tions are necessary to link different areas of knowledge (Presmeg, in press).
Fifth, an essential point for learning mathematics concerns the problem of
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the meaning of signs used in mathematics (Do¨rfler, 2000; Radford, in press;
Sa´enz-Ludlow, in press).
The term ‘semiotics’ simply means ‘theory of signs’ (Posner et al., 1997
ff.; No¨th, 2000), but the problem is that there are very different traditions in
semiotics stemming from a variety of disciplines which have very specific
interests (linguistics, philosophy, psychology, etc.). Hoffmann (in press-
a) has argued that for educational purposes a most promising semiotic
tradition is the one whose founding father was the American philosopher
Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914): his semiotics is the only one grounded on a
strong epistemological basis which is, in particular, adequate for discussing
the question of how the abstract objects of mathematics are accessible for
human beings. Although it has become evident that the problem fields
listed above can be treated in an interesting manner by Peirce’s semiotics,
this semiotic theory has hardly been used to answer the question of how
learning from signs is possible.4
Just this is the central question of our article. We show how Peirce’s
concepts of ‘diagrammatic reasoning’ and ‘hypostatic abstractions’ can be
taken as a basis for a semiotic theory of learning mathematics. We elaborate
on an example from a study on learning statistics, which used a Peircean
semiotic framework to answer the question of how students learn statistical
key concepts such as distribution by using their own representations of
mathematical problems, by talking about them, and by inventing a specific
language for their communication (Bakker, 2004).
From research in statistics education, we know that students have prob-
lems in reasoning about a data set as a whole without being preoccupied by
the individual data points (Hancock et al., 1992; Konold and Higgins, 2003;
Bakker and Gravemeijer, 2004; Ben-Zvi and Arcavi, 2001). An essential
characteristic of statistics is that it can predict properties of aggregates, but
not of individual values. Therefore, if students cannot see a data set as a
whole, they miss the essential point of doing statistics.
The problem here is that younger students generally do not see ‘five feet’
as a value of the variable ‘height’, but as a personal characteristic of, say,
Jenny. In other words, they easily say “Jenny is five feet tall,” but are not
inclined to think of it as “Jenny’s height is five feet.” Only in the latter for-
mulation, ‘height’ is abstracted from a set of tall persons and hypostatized
as an (abstract) entity or object of its own. Hence, students should learn
to disconnect the measurement value from the object or person measured,
consider data against a background of possible measurement values, and
see the measured variable as an object-like entity. Doing this, they would
perform a ‘hypostatic abstraction’ in the terms of Peirce’s semiotics. This
can be accomplished if students develop a notion5 of distribution. This con-
cept is namely an organizing structure with which they can see the whole
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instead of just the elements (Cobb, 1999; Petrosino et al., 2003; Bakker
and Gravemeijer, 2004).
The central problem with general or abstract concepts such as ‘distribu-
tion’ is that we can refer to them only by signs. We even need signs to think
about them. Almost everybody who reflects on the normal distribution, for
instance, will think of the famous bell shape. In other words, abstract con-
cepts and general forms such as distribution are no Platonic ‘forms’ that
‘exist’ independently of the visible world in a ‘heaven of forms’. Our thesis
is, by contrast, that abstract concepts become visible in signs and in their use
in mathematical activity. From this point of view, the problem of learning
mathematics shifts on to the problem of how students can learn culturally
accepted meanings of mathematical signs, and how they can use the signs’
meanings for their own mathematical activity and communication.
In this article, we take the question of how students learned the meaning
of an abstract concept of distribution as a paradigmatic example for a
semiotic theory of learning. First, we explain the semiotic terminology we
use. Second, we offer an analysis of students’ reasoning about distribution,
which is based on this semiotic approach.
2. PEIRCE’S SEMIOTIC TERMINOLOGY
In this section, we elaborate on Peirce’s semiotic theory insofar as we need it
to analyze the classroom episodes. The key concepts for analyzing the role
signs play in learning and communicating about mathematical problems
are ‘diagrammatic reasoning’ and ‘hypostatic abstraction’. Understanding
these concepts, however, demands some reflections on Peirce’s concept of
sign in general, and on his famous classification of iconic, indexical, and
symbolic signs in particular.
2.1. Sign
Signs play an important role in learning processes. According to Peirce:
All our thinking is performed upon signs of some kind or other, either imagined
or actually perceived. The best thinking, especially on mathematical subjects, is
done by experimenting in the imagination upon a diagram or other scheme, and it
facilitates the thought to have it before one’s eyes. (Peirce, NEM I, p. 122)6
The central advantage of Peirce’s semiotics – in contrast to Saussure’s
(1916/1966) for example – is that it is based on an epistemological reflection
on the role of signs as ‘mediators’ between objects of knowledge on the one
hand, and the meaning of these objects on the other. In Peirce’s semiotics,
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Figure 1. The sign in its triadic relation to object and interpretant.
a sign stands in a triadic relation to an object and what he called an
‘interpretant’ as represented in Figure 1.7 In contrast to Saussure’s dyadic
relation between ‘signifier’ and ‘signified’, which he defined as “the two
sides” within what he called a ‘sign’, for Peirce a ‘sign’ is integrated in a
triadic relation whose most important feature is what he called the sign’s
‘interpretant’.
In later writings, he defined this ‘interpretant’ generally as “the proper
significant outcome of a sign,” or as its ‘effect’ (CP 5.473, 5.475; 1907).
Thus, the interpretant can be a reaction to a sign or the effect in acting,
feeling, and thinking or, in other words, the sign’s ‘meaning’. According
to Peirce’s later differentation of possible interpretants, this meaning again
can either be located within an individual person or within a community.
What might be called the ‘objective’ meaning of a sign is, for Peirce,
the ‘final logical interpretant’ as it comes out ideally ‘in the long run’ of
scientific communication.8 Therefore, it is important not to confuse the
Peircean ‘interpretant’ with the ‘interpreter’.
As Whitson (2003) observes, the interpretant as a reaction or effect need
not be the necessary effect of a cause, but is a sign-mediated response. This
effect can lead to the production of a new sign. The involvement of an inter-
pretant implies, first of all, that the meaning of a Peircean sign is not fixed
forever, but open for interpretation. Also, an object can be represented by
different signs, and any sign can be interpreted in quite different ways. An
action or sign-mediated effect need not be a response to one single sign,
but could be the response to several signs. Conversely, the effect of inter-
preting a sign can also be multiple actions or the production of multiple
signs. Sign-activity therefore occurs within series, webs,9 and networks of
signs in which interpretants are responses to objects through the mediation
of signs (Whitson, 2003). Peirce’s conception of a triadic sign relation per-
mits thus a representation also of ‘non-linear’ processes of interpretation
which are characteristic of the complexity of classroom communication.
We will present the idea of a ‘semiotic space’ to represent networks of
representation and interpretation (see Figure 2 below). This seems to be
DIAGRAMMATIC REASONING ABOUT DISTRIBUTION 337
(a)
(b)
Figure 2. (a) A value-bar graph of Minitool 1, with options to sort value bars by size, by
color, to hide subsets, hide bars, and select a range. The data are life spans of two battery
brands in hours (see Bakker and Gravemeijer, in press). (b) A dot plot in Minitool 2, with
options to organize data, for instance, into fixed interval width (histogram), into two equal
groups (median), and four equal groups (box plot). This is the same data set as in Figure 2a.
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an important advantage in comparison with the linear ‘chains of significa-
tion’ which are sometimes used for classroom analysis (Walkerdine, 1988;
Whitson, 1997; Gravemeijer et al., 2000; cf. Cobb, 2002).
We give two examples to clarify how signs stand in a triadic relation
to an object and an interpretant. If a student reads the sign “2 ∗ 5 =” in an
elementary school textbook, the interpretant can be the number 10, which
might then be articulated as a new sign. In that case, the interpretant is the
result of calculating the product. The interpretant is not a necessary effect
as the student could make a mistake.
A more complex example is Whitson’s (1997) umbrella example. As-
sume someone looks at a falling barometer (sign) and picks up his umbrella
(interpretant). Presumably, the barometer reading is being interpreted as a
sign of rain (object). Assume someone else sees him pick up his umbrella
(sign) and also picks up her umbrella (interpretant). Others might decide,
seeing the two leaving with umbrellas (sign), not to go out for lunch (in-
terpretant). At a more detailed level, the barometer reading is already an
interpretant which takes the needle position as a sign of atmospheric pres-
sure. And it is easy to extend this example in many directions. For instance,
the decision not to go out for lunch might be a response to the combination
of seeing colleagues with umbrellas and listening to a weather report.
This umbrella example stresses that action is involved in Peirce’s sign
theory due to the interpretant (such as picking up an umbrella). This is
why Peirce’s concept of sign is often characterized as more dynamic than
Saussure’s (Whitson, 1997). The example also illustrates the non-linear
character of sign activity, because an interpretant can well be the response
to different signs, and interpreting a sign can lead to different interpretants.
A further important aspect of Peirce’s signs that we need to address
concerns both the possibilities that signs can be composed of other signs
and that they can be components of more complex signs. That is important
for an adequate understanding of his concept of a ‘diagram’, which we need
for the central concept of ‘diagrammatic reasoning’. Peirce distinguished
three kinds of signs – icon, index, and symbol – which are the most famous
inventions of Peirce’s semiotics today. They are elementary signs, so they
are not further reducible. Due to their importance, we define them in a few
words.
2.2. Icon
The key characteristic of an icon is similarity to its object. Its main function
is to represent relations. Icons represent things by imitation, for example
photographs, but the resemblance may also be intellectual as by repre-
senting grammatical relations in a sentence, or by representing algebraic
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relations in an equation (Peirce, EP II, 17; NEM III, 887). Icons do not
claim the existence of what they represent, but “the Form of the Icon . . .
must be logically possible” (CP 4.531). In CP 2.277, Peirce introduces
three subcategories of icons: ‘image’, ‘diagram’, and ‘metaphor’ (see also
Stjernfelt, 2000).
2.3. Index
The main function of indices is to direct someone’s attention to something,
exactly as in everyday language when we use the indices ‘here’, ‘there’,
‘now’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘next’, or the letters we use in geometry or the variables
in algebra (cf. CP 1.369; NEM III, p. 887).
2.4. Symbol
Symbols have become associated with their objects or meanings by usage,
habit, or rule. Thus, if we interpret ‘5’ as a sign for the mathematical object
5, it is a symbol.
A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law,
usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the symbol to be
interpreted as referring to that Object. (Peirce, EP II, 292)
Hence, words and phrases are symbols as well as what is traditionally
called a symbol in mathematics. The letter π standing for the ratio of
circumference to diameter of a circle is a symbol, but note that the letter π
printed on this page is not a symbol but only a ‘replica’ of the symbol. Peirce
used the terms ‘token’ and ‘type’ to make this distinction. An example he
often used was the word ‘the’. As a word, ‘the’ is a type (a symbol), but
the instances on this page are only tokens or replicas of it.10
2.5. Diagram
Peirce defines a ‘diagram’ as a sign “which is predominantly an icon of
relations and is aided to be so by conventions. Indices are also more or less
used.” (Peirce, CP 4.418, 1903). Thus, a diagram is a complex sign which
includes icons, indices, and symbols (as indicated by the hint at conven-
tions). Most important, however, is its iconic character, which results from
the fact that a diagram, first of all, is supposed to represent relations. Thus,
geometrical figures such as triangles are diagrams because they represent
particular relations of lines and vertices that are indicated by letters. Log-
ical propositions are diagrams, because they represent certain relations of
other propositions, symbols and indices (e.g. the modus ponens).
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One reason why diagrams were so important for Peirce is that one can
experiment with them according to a certain syntax, since in contrast to
simple icons, diagrams “should be carried out upon a . . . system of repre-
sentation” (Peirce, CP 4.418, 1903). Logic, algebra, axiom systems, and
natural language are thus examples of representational systems. According
to this syntax, any experiment performed on diagrams will necessarily lead
to certain experiences (CP 5.9; cf. Hoffmann, in press-b). This does not
mean that all of the students have the same experiences, nor that they need
to know all conventions and hidden rules of the diagrams they make.
Is a diagram a thing on paper or a computer screen, or is it a general type?
A diagram on paper is a token, a visible particular. However, if the relations
of a diagram are interpreted as ideal, the diagram is a type. For example,
if we prove that the angles of a triangle in Euclidean geometry sum up to
180◦ we use a geometrical diagram as a type, because we cannot prove
any general or ideal relations from just the token of one particular drawing
if it is not interpreted as standing for a triangle as a general mathematical
concept.
With this distinction, we can clarify the close link between statistical
diagrams and concepts. If diagrams are just taught as tokens (how do you
draw a box plot?), students are unlikely to conclude any general or aggregate
information from them. To develop concepts, students need to learn to
reason with diagrams as types. This issue leads us to Peirce’s concepts of
diagrammatic reasoning and hypostatic abstraction.
2.6. Diagrammatic reasoning
For Peirce, diagrammatic reasoning involves three steps.
1. The first step is to construct a diagram (or diagrams) by means of a
representational system such as Euclidean geometry, but we can also
think of diagrams in computer software or of an informal student sketch
of a statistical distribution. Such a construction of diagrams is motivated
by the need to represent the relations that students consider significant
in a problem. This first step may be called ‘diagrammatization’.
2. The second step of diagrammatic reasoning is to experiment with the
diagram (or diagrams). Any experimenting with a diagram is being ex-
ecuted within a representational system and is a rule or habit-driven
activity (today we would stress that this activity is situated within a
practice). What makes experimenting with diagrams important is the
rationality that is immanent in them (Hoffmann, in press-b). The rules
define the possible transformations and actions, but also the constraints
of operations on diagrams. Statistical diagrams such as dot plots are also
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bound to certain rules: a dot has to be put above its value on the x-axis
and this remains true if the scale is being changed. Peirce stresses the im-
portance of doing something when thinking or reasoning with diagrams:
Thinking in general terms is not enough. It is necessary that something should
be DONE. In geometry, subsidiary lines are drawn. In algebra, permissible
transformations are made. Thereupon the faculty of observation is called into
play. (CP 4.233)
3. The third step is to observe the results of experimenting and reflect on
them. As Peirce wrote, the diagram constructed by a mathematician
“puts before him an icon by the observation of which he detects
relations between the parts of the diagram other than those which
were used in its construction” (NEM III, 749). In this way, he can
“discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts” (CP 3.363;
see also CP 1.383). The power of diagrammatic reasoning is that “we
are continually bumping up against hard fact. We expected one thing,
or passively took it for granted, and had the image of it in our minds,
but experience forces that idea into the background, and compels us to
think quite differently” (CP 1.324; cf. Hull, 1994).
Diagrammatic reasoning, in particular the reflection step, is what can
bring in the ‘new’ thing. New implications within a given representational
system can be found, but possibly the need is felt to construct a new diagram
that better serves its purpose, or even to develop the used representational
system itself. If new concepts are created in this innovative step, we are
confronted with what Peirce discussed under the heading of ‘hypostatic
abstraction’.
2.7. Hypostatic abstraction
Peirce distinguished two types of abstraction, ‘prescissive’ and ‘hypostatic’
abstraction. Prescissive abstraction is dispensing with certain features; for
example, if we use a geometrical line we dispense with the width of the
line (CP 4.235). Hypostatic abstraction, by contrast, is regarding a certain
characteristic of a set of objects as a new object.11 For Peirce, “an ‘object’
means that which one speaks or thinks of” (NEM I, 124). Hypostatic ab-
straction puts “an abstract noun in place of a concrete predicate” (NEM
IV, 160). This is not just a linguistic trick, but a genuinely creative act
that allows the making of discoveries with new eyes. For Peirce, “[Hypo-
static] abstraction is an essential part of almost every really helpful step in
mathematics” (NEM IV, p. 160).
Note that the term ‘abstraction’ can both mean the process and the
product (cf. Noss and Hoyles, 1996, 123). In this paper we use the term
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‘hypostatic abstraction’ for a product (as the result of a process). Let us con-
sider examples to provide a clearer image of what this concept of hypostatic
abstraction entails.
If we change “honey is sweet” into “honey possesses sweetness” (CP
4.235) and consider ‘sweetness’ as an object that we can talk about, we have
a simple example of hypostatic abstraction. In the first sentence, ‘sweet’
is a predicate of something, but in the second sentence, ‘sweetness’ is
considered as an object in itself. In mathematics, a collection is a hypostatic
abstraction. And cardinal numbers are hypostatic abstractions derived from
a predicate of a collection (Peirce, CP 5.534).
Another example of hypostatic abstraction is that of forming a notion
of ‘spread’ as described by Bakker (2004). Students first used predicates
to characterize the relative position of the dots in a dot plot as “the dots
are spread out” (this can be called ‘predication’). The dots are objects that
refer to data values and ‘spread out’ is a predicate of the dots. Later students
write that “the spread is large.” In that case, spread signifies a new object
that is characterized with the predicate ‘large’.
The central point of diagrammatic reasoning is that it creates the basis
for forming hypostatic abstractions, that is new objects such as those signi-
fied by the terms dots, shape, or spread. Hypostatic abstraction takes place
when part of a diagram becomes perceived as an entity on its own, a new
object. The central point of hypostatic abstraction, in turn, is that the new
objects formed by this process can be used as means for further diagramma-
tization, and for further steps of learning. For instance, once the shape of
a distribution is hypostatized as a ‘bump’, it can next be used for shift-
ing bumps when comparing distributions. With regard to this point, Otte
(1997, p. 360) coined the term ‘complementarity’ or ‘dialectic of means
and objects’ as the essence of mathematical activity. Learning abstract con-
cepts, from this point of view, means creating new objects by hypostatic
abstraction and using them as new means of mediation between the subject
and the object of cognition. These new objects – as ‘independent’ from the
subject’s activity – are the starting point for further hypostatic abstractions,
forming thus an ongoing process of generalizing mathematical concepts
and structures that ‘echoes’ the history of mathematics.
3. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE TEACHING EXPERIMENT
The seventh-grade class we report on in this article consisted of 28 students
(age 12–13) in the pre-university stream of a Dutch public school of about
800 students. The classroom-based teaching experiment lasted 15 lessons
of 50 min each. The data corpus consisted of audiorecordings of the lessons,
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student work, field notes, a final test, and mini-interviews with all students.
These mini-interviews lasted from about 20 s to 4 min, and were meant to
find out how students thought using statistical concepts and diagrams. The
teaching experiment was part of a larger design research study (Bakker,
2004) in which a ‘hypothetical learning trajectory’ (Simon, 1995) was
developed with the end goal that students would learn to reason about the
shape of a distribution. In the 10 lessons prior to the episodes we describe
here, students had learned to compare distributions using their notions of
mean, median, majority, outliers, range, and had developed a language in
which they could express spread and density issues using such terms as
“here the dots are spread out” and “there they are close together.” In 5 of
the 10 lessons, students had used simple computer tools that were called
Minitools (see e.g. Cobb, 1999; Bakker and Gravemeijer, 2004). The first
Minitool supplies a bar graph in which each bar has a length corresponding
to the data value it represents (Figure 2a); the second Minitool provides a
dot plot (Figure 2b). In the first Minitool, students can organize data, for
instance by sorting or hiding subsets of data, and by sorting the data by size.
In the second Minitool, students can organize data with different options,
for instance making their own groups, two equal groups (precursor to the
median), four equal groups (precursor to box plot), and fixed interval width
(precursor to histogram).
4. ANALYSIS OF STUDENTS’ REASONING WITH THE BUMP
Because reasoning about distribution as a whole and an object-like entity
was the end goal of the hypothetical learning trajectory, we focus the analy-
sis on students’ reasoning that came closest to this end goal: their reasoning
with the ‘bump’. In this section, we first analyze how the bump became
a topic of discussion in the 11th lesson. Then we look back at students’
relevant prior experiences and look forward to how students reasoned with
bumps in later lessons.
4.1. The bump became a topic of discussion
Because it was Mike’s diagram in Figure 3 that gave rise to the discussion
about the bump, we first analyze his diagrammatization, the first step of
diagrammatic reasoning. He explained how he made his diagram (S2 in
Figure 4) from the available data values (S1 in Figure 4) as represented in
a table, which was filled in by the students. Referring to his diagram, he
said during the class discussion:
Look, you have roughly, averagely speaking, how many students had that weight
and there I have put a dot. And then I have left [y-axis] the number of students.
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Figure 3. Mike’s idiosyncratic line graph of the class’s weights.
Figure 4. Semiosis over three signs (produced by the students, by Mike, and by the teacher)
within a semiotic space.
There is one student who weighs about 35 [kg], and there is one who weighs 36,
and two who weigh 38 roughly.
We first analyze his diagrammatization on an individual level and then
analyze how this sign functioned collectively in the class discussion (as
Whitson’s umbrella example shows, the episode can be analyzed on differ-
ent levels of detail). Judging from his explanation, Mike interpreted data
values in the table as standing for students’ weights (O: objects). This in-
terpretation, which is not visible for us, as it is something that happens at
first only in his mind, is called his ‘interpretant’ (IM ) in Peircean terms.
What is observable, however, is the explanation of his action of construct-
ing his diagram and the result of it, the diagram itself. It is this explanation
which permits formulating a hypothesis about what the interpretant he had
formed might have been. From a semiotic point of view, we could say
Mike ‘transformed’ his interpretant into a new sign, his diagram. After
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grouping the data values and counting the frequency of each group, Mike
represented those groups of weight data values (objects) with dots (signs),
and this led him to the next action of connecting the dots to what looks like
a frequency polygon (see Figure 3). Because of the irregular step size it is
not a conventional way of representing a frequency distribution.
We now turn to the analysis on the class level by considering what we
have called the ‘semiotic space’ of classroom communication (Figure 4).
In the hypothetical learning trajectory, we had aimed for reasoning about
shape assuming that it would support reasoning about the whole data set
(an aggregate view) instead of just individual data values (a case-oriented
view). When the teacher saw Mike’s graph, she realized that this was an
opportunity to initiate a discussion on shape as intended in the hypothetical
learning trajectory. When collectively comparing Mike’s and Emily’s graph
(Figure 5), she asked:
Teacher: What can you easily see in this graph [Mike made]?
Laura: Well, that the average, that most students in the class, uhm, well, are
between 39 and, well, 48 [kg].
Teacher: Yes, here you can see at once which weight most students in this class
roughly have, what is about the biggest group. Just because you see this
bump here. We lost the bump in Emily’s graph.
This is how the teacher introduced the term ‘bump’ (S3) to refer to the
specific shape in Mike’s diagram (S2). But what exactly is this shape? De-
pending on how it was interpreted, it could be anything ranging from a
visual image of a bump to a symbol of a slightly skewed unimodal distri-
bution. In other words, the shape can have different functions, as we clarify
in the following.
The teacher herself probably interpreted the shape as standing for a uni-
modal distribution. The students probably first interpreted the sign ‘bump’
as a metaphor because of the resemblance of the shape to a bump. The
teacher then turned to Emily’s graph. This is a value-bar graph, just as
Minitool 1, but with the value bars turned at an angle. Each shorter and
lighter bar stands for a weight data value; each longer and darker value bar
for a height data value. The data values of boys and girls are represented
by different colors. The horizontal lines represent means of various sub-
groups. By asking what happened to the bump in Emily’s graph (Figure 5),
the teacher stimulated students to reflect on the shape as a diagram rep-
resenting relations between data values. For example, when the teacher
asked about the bump in Emily’s graph, Nathalie explained:
Nathalie: The difference between . . . they stand from small to tall, so the bump,
that is where the things, where the bars [from Emily’s graph] are closest
to one another.
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Figure 5. Emily’s graph.
Teacher: What do you mean, where the bars are closest?
Nathalie: The difference, the endpoints [of the bars], do not differ so much with
the next one.
And Evelien added:
Evelien: If you look well, then you see that almost in the middle, there it is straight
almost and uh, [teacher points at the horizontal part in Emily’s graph]
yeah that.
Teacher: And that is what you [Nathalie] also said, uh, they are close together and
here they are bunched up, as far as (. . .) weight is concerned.
Evelien: And that is also that bump.
In our interpretation, the object that these students referred to was a
group of values that were close together and that they had previously also
called the ‘majority’. The mental transformation of part of Emily’s dia-
gram into the bump of Mike’s diagram or vice versa can be interpreted
as a form of mental experimentation with diagrams. The episode there-
fore includes the three steps of diagrammatic reasoning: diagrammatiza-
tion, experimentation, and reflection. This kind of diagrammatic reasoning
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has been a basis for the students to think about some essential aspects of
statistical representations. By interpreting signs in a kind of ‘interpreting
game’ (Sa´enz-Ludlow, 2003), by communicating about these signs, and by
producing new signs, the students had an opportunity to learn statistical
concepts.
Most interesting, perhaps, is the significance the term ‘bump’ has re-
ceived in this situation. The term is a hypostatic abstraction as defined above
according to Peirce. Within the classroom discourse, the term ‘bump’ does,
of course, not yet refer to a very definite object and it is very unlikely that
students’ interpretations of the bump were all the same. Yet the step of
reasoning about shapes using the term ‘bump’ was an important step on
the way to reasoning about distributions.
4.2. Where it came from
Mike’s actions of grouping data values and drawing a line through dots have
a history. In his explanation he talks about average, which might imply that
his grouping action is inspired by averaging numbers in the first lessons of
the teaching experiment. They had learned to estimate the mean of a data
set visually with a vertical reference line in plots such as Figure 6. During
an activity on battery life spans, students had learned to talk about groups
of data (e.g. “the high values of brand K”). It is also possible that Mike’s
experience with the Minitool 2 option of grouping data (e.g. making your
own groups; cf. Figure 2b) inspired him to group the data. His next action
was making a y-axis with frequencies and connecting the dots as in a line
graph (which, as we mentioned, is not a conventional way of representing
data). As Walkerdine (1988) and Cobb (2002) note, signs such as the bump
should be viewed within a particular practice, that is for a particular purpose
Figure 6. The ‘bump’ as a means of reasoning in the battery context.
348 A. BAKKER AND M.H.G. HOFFMANN
with other mathematical practices in the background. We therefore note that
Mike had learned to make line graphs in mathematics lessons where such
graph practices had been established. In the statistics lessons the students
had never used frequency polygons or line graphs before.
The background of Emily’s diagram (Figure 5) must be her experience
with Minitool 1; she only turned the bars to a vertical position. The hori-
zontal lines she drew represent the weight and height means of boys, girls,
and the whole class. This action most likely stems from estimating averages
with a reference line in Minitool 1 in earlier lessons. In other words, due
to their experimenting with the Minitools students were probably able to
construct these diagrams and reason sensibly about them.
When observing in the classroom, we thought that the ‘bump’ referred
to the distribution as a whole, as we intended in the hypothetical learning
trajectory. It was by going back to the history of students’ actions and their
exact formulations that we realized that students were just referring to the
values that were close to one another and not to the whole distribution when
using the term ‘bump’ (students also referred to this group as the ‘majority’
or the ‘average’). The transcript lines above of Nathalie and Evelien as well
as transcripts of later lessons support this claim.
The fact that several students were able to understand the link between
Emily’s and Mike’s diagrams is probably due to their experimentation
experience with the Minitools and their reasoning with the hypostatic ab-
stractions they had formed before. By solving statistical problems with
diagrams they had developed a language with which they could reason
with12 hypostatic abstractions such as majority, average, range, low and
high values. It is likely that these notions formed the basis for interpreting
the bump, because the bump was initially interpreted as the majority or
average group of the data.
4.3. Where it went
In the next (12th) lesson, when students revisited the problem on battery life
spans of two brands D and K (Figure 6), some students used the term ‘bump’
to indicate a specific group of the data and the straight part in Minitool 1.
This indicates that they used the ‘bump’, a hypostatic abstraction, as a
means for reasoning. For example:
Laura: But then you see the bump here, let’s say [Figure 6].
Yvonne: This is the bump [pointing at the straight vertical part of the lower
ten bars left of the letter D)].
Researcher: Where is that bump? Is it where you put that red line [the vertical
reference line]?
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Laura: Yes, we used that reference line for it (. . .) to indicate it, indicate the
bump. If you look at green [brand K, the upper ten value bars], then
you see that it lies further [to the right], the bump. So we think that
green is better, because the bump is further up.
These examples illustrate that students did not interpret the bump just
as a metaphor because there is no likeness of a bump with the straight
part in the diagram. The bump had become a symbol for several students,
standing for the middle group of values that were close together, and this
was by convention or habit grown out of the previous lesson. Apart from
the term ‘bump’, students also used ‘majority’ or ‘average’ to refer to such
groups of values that were close together. This ‘majority’ is not a very well
defined object, but at least students talk and think about a group of data
values with fuzzy borders. Note, however, that it is possible to talk about
the bump because there are also less frequent values that do not belong
to the majority. The fact that Laura and Yvonne use the term ‘bump’ to
indicate the straight part in Minitool 1 (Figure 6) shows that they have
mentally constructed an object that is roughly the majority. In other words,
they use the bump as a means in comparing distributions.13
We now give more examples of students’ experimenting with and re-
flecting on diagrams in the 13th lesson. In that lesson, the hypothetical
learning trajectory aimed at letting students use the term ‘bump’ for the
whole distribution and stimulating them to use shapes as means in their
reasoning. This aim was inspired by a remark of Sfard (1991) that to stim-
ulate the formation of a concept as an object, we have to create a situation
in which students need such a concept as an object and not merely as a pro-
cedure or a batch of individual objects. We asked students about a larger
sample to make the stability of the shape of a distribution a topic of dis-
cussion and we asked about the weight graph of older students to stimulate
that students would shift the bump as an object.
In the 13th lesson, there were indeed indications that several students
came to relate the ‘bump’ to the whole distribution instead of just the ‘ma-
jority’ or ‘average’ group. Emily, for example, incorporated the ‘outliers’
in her reasoning about the shape of the bump, with which she meant very
low or high values (statisticians reserve the term ‘outliers’ for exceptional
or suspect values outside the distribution).
Researcher: If you would measure all seventh graders in the city instead
of just your class, how would the graph change, or wouldn’t it
change?
Emily: Then there would come a little more to the left and a little more to
the right. Then the bump would become a little wider, I think. [She
explained this using the term ‘outliers’.]
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Researcher: Is there anybody who does not agree?
Mike: Yes, if there are more children, then the average, so the most, that
also becomes more. So the bump stays just the same.
Anissa: I think that the number of children becomes more and that the bump
stays the same.
Emily explained that the bump would become wider because of new
‘outliers’ (extreme values). This implies that she used the term ‘bump’
for the whole shape instead of just the majority or average group. What
is interesting about Mike and Anissa’s remarks is that they seemed to
have a sense of the shape’s stability even if the sample grows. If they had
interpreted the bump as just the middle group, they would probably have
thought that the bump would grow higher because of there being more dots.
It could well be that students started to use the term ‘bump’ for the whole
distribution because of the discourse on what students called ‘outliers’ (low
and high values that are less frequent than average values). The students
could only see a ‘majority’ because there were values that occurred less
often, which they called ‘outliers’. These high or low values are high or
low because they differ considerably from the majority (the bump) and the
bump is a bump because there are also values that do not occur so often.
This mentally dividing data sets into three groups seems to be a natural
way for students to think of data sets, as we inferred from the analyses of
other lessons.
The reasoning with bumps in larger samples could be seen as experi-
menting with a diagram in the mind. This also holds for students’ reasoning
in reaction to the following question that was meant to stimulate a shift of
the bump as a whole and as an object-like entity.
Teacher: What would a graph of the weights of eighth graders [instead of seventh
graders] look like?
Gerdien: The bump would be more to the right.
If Gerdien mentally shifted the whole bump to the right, the object she
referred to was probably the whole distribution and not just the ‘majority’
of the data values. As intended in the hypothetical learning trajectory, the
question had so to speak created a need in which students could best operate
with the bump as one object, the whole distribution.
As we wrote in the previous section, diagrammatic reasoning offers the
opportunity for hypostatic abstraction, the formation of objects (what can
be talked about or thought of). In this section we encountered steps of
hypostatic abstraction: the bump as standing for a majority and later for the
whole distribution. In reasoning about the bumps students used hypostatic
abstractions such as majority, outliers, and average, which they had formed
in previous lessons, but still needed refinement. This means that the process
DIAGRAMMATIC REASONING ABOUT DISTRIBUTION 351
of developing a notion of distribution involves several steps of hypostatic
abstraction and a gradual refinement of what the formed objects are. The
way a few students reasoned about and with the bump shows that they
developed a notion that comes close to the concept of distribution: they
used the bump to model hypothetical data. Some probably realized that the
shape would be stable across larger sample sizes.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we have applied a semiotic framework for analyzing stu-
dents’ learning. The episodes were framed as instances of diagrammatic
reasoning, which in turn formed the basis for hypostatic abstraction. The
key steps of diagrammatic reasoning are making a diagram, experimenting
with it, and reflecting on the results. During this diagrammatic reasoning,
hypostatic abstractions such as majority, average, and shape can be taken as
objects in the discourse, and next used as means in communication and fur-
ther reasoning. In our paradigmatic example, we focused on the emergence
of the bump.
The analysis shows that diagrammatization depends on a variety of
interpretations in the class (semiotically hypostatized as interpretants in
Figure 4), and that it can involve multiple actions. Mike, for example,
informally grouped the weight data values, used dots at certain positions
to signify these groups and the frequencies, and connected the dots to one
shape. All of these actions have a history, either in the teaching experiment
(grouping data, using dots) or in prior mathematics lessons (line graph).
During the reflection on the diagrams, the teacher used the term ‘bump’
to make this shape the topic of discussion (or in other words: an object).
Students might have first interpreted the bump as an iconic sign (a visual
image or a metaphor), but the analysis shows that the meaning of the bump
changed from the 11th to the 13th lesson, at least for several students. In
the 11th lesson, students used the bump to refer to a group of values that
were close together in the middle part of the graphs. The interesting thing
is that the same data set looks so different in different student graphs. By
asking what had happened to the bump in Mike’s graph in Emily’s graph,
the teacher stimulated students to formulate what exactly the object was
which looked like a bump in Mike’s graph and as a straight line in Emily’s
graph. This object, a group of values that were close together, can be seen as
a hypostatic abstraction. We can also speak of it as the common conceptual
structure underlying aspects of both graphs.
In the 12th lesson, several students used the term ‘bump’ even for a
group of data if there was no visual bump, for instance when they referred
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to the vertical straight part in value-bar graphs as a bump (Figure 6). This
implies that the bump was not just a visual characteristic, but had become
a conceptual object and even a means in their reasoning, for instance in
arguing which of the two battery brands was better.
In the 13th lesson, several students referred to ‘bump’ as the whole
shape, whereas before they only referred to the high part of the mound
shape (a group of values being close together). The development of the
bump as a whole was probably stimulated by questions about hypothetical
situations in which students needed the bump as an object-like entity, as
anticipated in the hypothetical learning trajectory. When we asked about
the shape of the graph with a much larger sample, one student argued that
it would grow wider if the sample got bigger because there would be more
very low and high values and other students reasoned that the bump would
stay the same because there would also be more ‘average’ values. Students
also answered the question of what would happen if students of a higher
grade would be measured. One student said that the bump would be shifted
to the right. In that sense, the bump had become an object encapsulating the
data set as a whole, which in turn can be operated with. Several students
were able to relate aspects of that shape to distribution aspects such as
average, majority, groups of values, and several acknowledged the stability
of the shape across sample size. They even hypothesized on the shape of
a large sample, which means they modeled hypothetical situations with a
notion of distribution.
The analysis presented here can be taken as a paradigmatic example of
explaining learning as a process of diagrammatic reasoning in which oppor-
tunities for hypostatic abstraction occurred. Using Peirce’s semiotics, we
realized that the hypothetical learning trajectory could be seen as progres-
sive diagrammatic reasoning about distribution aspects (including average,
spread, and shape). This process has been described by the three core steps
of diagrammatic reasoning: making a diagram, experimenting with it, and
reflecting on the results. Our analyses suggest the following recommenda-
tions.
First, it is clear students need to diagrammatize – make their own dia-
grams that make sense to them, but also learn powerful conventional types
of diagrams. To stimulate aggregate views on data, we asked students to
make diagrams according to aggregate features, e.g. of an unreliable bat-
tery brand with a high life span. In another class, we also asked students to
make diagrams with small or large spread, and even a diagram with a large
range but small spread. This can be called diagrammatization according to
aggregate features.
Second, students need to experiment with diagrams. Educational soft-
ware such as the Minitools can be useful in this stage of diagrammatic
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reasoning. The software should offer diagrams that students understand,
but it should also offer opportunities for learning more advanced, culturally
accepted diagrams.
Third, reflection should be stimulated. Throughout the research we no-
ticed that the best reasoning occurred during teacher-directed class discus-
sions that were not in the computer lab. One of the core goals is that students
learn to describe (‘predicate’) and predict aggregate features of data sets,
because that is an essential characteristic of statistical data analysis. This
implies that students should be stimulated to describe features of data sets
and diagrams, and predict features of hypothetical situations.
Throughout this article we have argued that diagrammatic reasoning
creates opportunities for developing concepts or, more generally, for form-
ing hypostatic abstractions. This way of forming objects can be stimulated
in different ways. First, predicates should become topics of discussion so
that they can be taken as entities in themselves. For example, talking about
‘most’ data can lead to talking about the ‘majority’; describing how dots are
‘spread out’ can lead to saying that “the spread is large.” Second, students
should be stimulated to be precise about what they refer to. For instance, if
they use indexical words such as ‘that’ or ‘it’, it is possible that they cannot
express or do not know to which object they exactly refer. In retrospect,
we concluded we should have asked in which range exactly students saw
the majority and where they saw the bump in order to make the ‘major-
ity’ a clear topic of discussion. Precisely defining the topic of discussion
is thus integral to conceptual development. Third, we should create situa-
tions in which students need conceptual objects as means of reasoning (cf.
Sfard, 1991). When the teacher asked what would happen to the diagram
if data of an older class were shown, students were stimulated to use the
bump as an object and shift it to the right as a whole. Fourth, compar-
ing multiple representations (cf. Van Someren et al., 1998) of one thing
can support students in thinking of the common structure (a hypostatic
abstraction) underlying these representations. In the 11th lesson, students
compared several diagrams of one and the same data set and the teacher
stimulated them to think of why the bump in one diagram looked differ-
ently in another diagram (Emily’s). In explaining this, students referred to
what the bump and the value bars stood for: values that were close to each
other.
Diagrams are, in Peirce’s epistemologically based semiotics, not only
means of communication, but more fundamentally means of thought, of
understanding, and of reasoning. From that epistemological point of view,
the essence of diagrammatic reasoning can be seen in the fact that it offers
the basis for hypostatic abstractions – cognitive means that can be used and
developed in further diagrammatic reasoning.
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NOTES
1. Cf. for instance Janvier, 1987; Goldin and Kaput, 1996; Seeger, 1998; Cobb et al.,
2000; Gravemeijer et al., 2000; Hitt, 2002, and the papers published in two Special
Issues on “Representations and the Psychology of Mathematics Education,” Journal
of Mathematical Behavior 1999 (17), Numbers 1 and 2, edited by Gerald Goldin and
Claude Janvier.
2. Whitson, 1997; Radford, 2000; Hoffmann, 2000; Anderson et al., 2003; and Sa´enz-
Ludlow, 2003.
3. Otte, in press; Roth, 2003; Steinbring, in press.
4. For a more theoretical discussion of this question see Kadunz, 2003; Hoffmann, 2003,
in press-b,c; Sa´enz-Ludlow, in press.
5. We use the term ‘notion’ for students’ notions of statistical concepts and the term
‘concept’ for concepts as they are defined or understood within the communities of
statisticians, educators, or semioticians.
6. Following common practice, we refer to Peirce’s Collected Papers as CP with vol-
ume number and section, to the New Elements of Mathematics as NEM with the
volume number, and to the Essential Peirce edited by the Peirce Edition Project as
EP.
7. The form of the triadic relation used in the diagram (like a Mercedes star) is justified
by Peirce, NEM IV 307 ff. (c. 1893), and Peirce, SEM II, 137 (1903).
8. For a more detailed explication of Peirce’s ‘interpretant’ see Hoffmann (in press-a,
Section 13).
9. Cf. the notion of ‘webbing’ (Noss and Hoyles, 1996).
10. Token is therefore very similar to what many researchers today call an ‘inscription’
(e.g. Roth and McGinn, 1998).
11. For Peirce, reification and hypostastic abstraction were the same; hypostasis is
just the Greek equivalent of the Latin reificatio, the making of an object. Thus,
there is no problem to link this discussion with Sfard’s (1991) use of the term
‘reification’.
12. We use the phrase ‘reason about’ if students mention properties of objects and ‘reason
with’ if they use these objects as tools in their reasoning.
13. Once students reached such understanding they might come to see that the position of
the bump can be measured with a median, because the median is generally somewhere
in that bump, even in skewed distributions (unlike the mean). See also Cobb et al.
(2003).
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